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I. Does the individual right to possess firearms extend beyond the home?  
II. If so, is the good cause requirement a permissible limitation on an individual’s right to 
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 The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit and the 
opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Columbia are contained 
within the record of the case (R. at 7, 14). 
 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on July 1, 2017. (R. at 19). Petitioner filed a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in timely fashion. This Court granted the Petition on November 13, 
2017. (R. at 20). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012).  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 This Court reviews a district court’s fact findings for clear error and its legal conclusions 
de novo.  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “a well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed.”  
 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, 






STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 Petitioner Alexandra Hamilton’s son was violently beaten and seriously injured during a 
home invasion in March of 2015. (R. at 3). This incident led to Ms. Hamilton suffering daily 
from panic attacks, anxiety, and developing a fear of men who resembled her son’s attacker; that 
is, men with tattoos and piercings. (R. at 3, 24). Ms. Hamilton also developed a fear for her own 
safety while at work, due to the fact that she often works alone. (R. at 3). Ms. Hamilton obtained 
a permit to carry a concealed weapon to protect herself, and her son, from future potentially 
violent confrontations. (R. at 7-8). In addition to age restrictions, required safety courses, and 
criminal background checks, the Columbia Penal Code further limits the availability of 
concealed carry permits to individuals who demonstrate a “good cause” for carrying. (R. at 21). 
Ms. Hamilton fulfilled all prerequisite conditions, and cited her son’s attack and her resulting 
fears as good-cause. (R. at 7, 24).  
 Approximately two months after acquiring her permit, Ms. Hamilton was on her way to 
accompany her son during one of his rehabilitation treatments late one evening. (R. at 3). An 
unknown man with tattoos and a facial piercing approached Ms. Hamilton while she walked 
alone through the parking lot. (R. at 4).  Frightened, Ms. Hamilton reflexively drew her pistol, 
pointed it at the unknown man, but never discharged the weapon. (R. at 4). The approaching 
stranger was an undercover police officer. He disarmed Ms. Hamilton. (R. at 4). Ms. Hamilton 
had unintentionally left her wallet with her concealed carry permit at her home that evening. (R. 
at 4). Consequently, she was ticketed for her inability to produce her permit and was fined 
$1,000 in accordance with the Columbia Penal Code. (R. at 4, 22). Burr County then revoked 
Ms. Hamilton’s permit because the county concluded that she no longer met the good cause pre-
requisite. (R. at 4, 8).  
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 In November of 2015, Ms. Hamilton filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Columbia that alleged the good-cause prerequisite for a concealed-
carry permit violated her Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. (R. at 8). The district 
court--looking to this Court’s reasoning in Heller v. District of Columbia 554 U.S. 570 (2008)--
held that the Second Amendment secured a right for individuals to publicly carry firearms. (R. at 
8). Additionally, the district court concluded that the restrictive good-cause provision of the 
Columbia Penal Code levied a substantial burden on the core of the Second Amendment, and 
that the good-cause requirement was unconstitutional by means of a strict scrutiny analysis. (R. 
at 10, 11).  
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit reversed the holding of the 
District Court. Specifically, the Fourteenth Circuit determined that the right protected by the 
Second Amendment did not authorize citizens to publicly carry concealed firearms. (R. at 15). 
The Fourteenth Circuit also concluded that the good-cause requirement was constitutional 
pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny analysis of constitutionality. (R. at 16). Ms. Hamilton timely 
filed a petition for certiorari which this Court granted on November 13, 2017. (R. at 20). 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I.  
 This Court defined the core of the Second Amendment as an individual right to self-
defense in Heller. The Heller court concluded that the individual right to self-defense was an 
intended protection of the Second Amendment by conducting an historical analysis of 18th and 
19th century case law, dictionaries, and state constitutions. Most fundamentally, this core right 
stems from the words “to keep and bear” of the text itself. The Heller court determined that these 
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words constituted two separate rights. The right to “keep” arms guarantees the right of the public 
to possess arms for the purpose of self-defense. The right to “bear” arms encompasses a 
protected right to carry, or wear arms for the basis of defending oneself from potential 
confrontation.  
 Because the right to carry for the purpose of protecting oneself from potential 
confrontation is protected, and because it is undisputed that confrontation may occur outside the 
home, it necessarily follows that the right to carry outside of the home is protected. As such, it is 
evident from the precedent established by Heller, and the plain meaning of the word “bear”, that 
the right to carry arms outside the home is included within the Second Amendment’s protections.  
 
II.  
 The good cause requirement places an impermissible limitation on the protected right of 
law-abiding individuals to carry a firearm in public for the purpose of self-defense. Because the 
right to carry in public for self-defense is a core protection of the Second Amendment, no 
amount of burden on the right is appropriate. The laws of Burr County prohibit individuals from 
openly carrying firearms in public. The only means by which individuals can exercise their core 
protected Second Amendment is by obtaining a Concealed Carry permit. Because the good cause 
requirement limits the ability to carry a concealed weapon to individuals who “distinguish 
[themselves] from the mainstream,” most Burr County citizens are unable to exercise their 
Second Amendment rights. Put another way, the combination of a ban on open carry, and a 
restrictive good cause requirement effectively bans the carrying of firearms in public for most 
citizens of Burr County. A limitation which prohibits a majority of citizens from exercising a 
protected right is unconstitutional.  
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 Burr County’s good cause requirement will fail any level of constitutional scrutiny. 
Assuming arguendo, that strict scrutiny is applicable, Burr County must supply sufficient 
evidence to support a specific compelling public interest, and that the regulation is the least 
restrictive alternative means of burdening the right. Assuming further that intermediate scrutiny 
is applicable, Burr County would have to establish sufficient evidence of a substantial link to an 
important public interest. The county has failed to meet the requirements of either standard of 
review. More specifically, Burr County fails to show that the good cause requirement is an 
effective means of improving public safety or decreasing gun violence.  
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RIGHT TO CARRY A FIREARM OUTSIDE THE HOME IS PROTECTED BY 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT  
 
 Historically, the relationship between American citizens and the possession of firearms is 
well established. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). In Heller, this Court 
delineated the long-standing tradition of Americans protecting the freedom to exercise their 
Second Amendment rights beginning with the inception of the amendment. Id. at 605-619. 
Through an historical analysis, this Court concluded that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to “possess and carry” firearms in anticipation of confrontation the purpose of 
self-defense. Before moving into the Second Amendment itself, it is important to illustrate that 
this Court has recognized that the Second Amendment applies to the States under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2011); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. As such, Burr County is subject to the Second Amendment 
and cannot violate the protections it affords.  
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 The Second Amendment states that the people shall have the right “to keep and bear 
arms.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. This Court has also conducted thorough analysis on the precise 
meaning of the key phrase of the Second Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
592 (2008). More specifically, the meaning of the words “keep” and “bear” were scrutinized 
under their dictionary definitions. Id. at 581-592. The unambiguous definition of the word 
“keep” is simply to possess. Id. at 582. Further, the word “bear” was defined as “to carry” at the 
time of the ratification of the constitution; the same is true of the modern definition of the word 
“bear.” Id. at 584. Importantly, Heller, is not the only instance in which this Court has defined 
“bear” in such a way. Ten years prior to the decision in Heller, Justice Ginsburg determined that 
the phrase “carries a firearm” was suggested by the Second Amendment. Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Ginsburg stated that a 
useful interpretation of “carries a firearm” was to “wear, bear, or carry” a firearm on one’s 
person. Id. Justice Ginsburg in Muscarello, and this Court in Heller each support the conclusion 
that the text of the Second Amendment guarantees a right to carry. Id., Heller, 554 U.S. at 584. 
  
A. The Second Amendment’s Purpose Establishes the Protected Right to Carry Extends 
Outside the Home 
 
 An examination of the Second Amendment’s purpose sheds light on exactly how the 
right to carry must extend outside the home. This Court’s precedent firmly establishes that the 
intended purpose of the Second Amendment was to guarantee a right to keep and carry weapons 
for the purpose of self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. As this Court in Heller states, the phrase 
“bear arms” is indicative of this purpose as it particularly pertinent to confrontation. Id. at 584. 
The right to carry a firearm for the purpose of self-defense is therefore protected under the 
Second Amendment. Id. Here, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis from Muscarello provides additional 
insight. Justice Ginsburg declared that one would carry a firearm with a preparatory purpose of 
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being equipped with a weapon “in case of conflict” with another individual. Muscarello, 524 
U.S. at 143 (internal quotations omitted).  
 This Court’s holding in Heller demonstrates that the need for the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense from confrontation is “most acute” in 
the home. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. To assume that this implies that the need exists solely in the 
home is illogical. Confrontations may, and often do, arise outside of the home, and the assertion 
that the Second Amendment right to self-defense from altercations for law-abiding citizens exists 
only in the home simply misconstrues the intended purpose of the Second Amendment. see Id.; 
see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Because the right to carry 
is protected, and the purpose of this right is for self-defense, the argument that the right to carry 
exists only in the home is unrealistic. The assumption that individuals can only exercise their 
right to carry for the purpose of self-defense within the confines of their home is borderline 
flippant. Proponents of such an argument would have to conclude that law-abiding gun owners 
are carrying their weapons around their homes to exercise their Second Amendment rights which 
presents an “awkward usage” that effectively separates the Second Amendment from its intended 
purpose of self-defense. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936-937 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 The notion of Second Amendment protections extending to carrying arms for the purpose 
of self-defense is exemplified in this Court’s holding in Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 
1027 (2016). In Caetano, a woman carried a stun gun because she felt the need to protect herself 
from an abusive ex-boyfriend. Id at 1028. Caetano’s violent ex-boyfriend attempted to assault 
her, but she was able to deter him by threatening to use her stun gun. Id. This Court determined 
that a stun gun was considered an “arm” and that it was subject to Second Amendment 
protections. Id. at 1027. Under Massachusetts law, stun guns were not eligible for Second 
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Amendment protection. Id. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in particular demonstrates how 
Caetano’s experience is indicative the connection between the Second Amendment and the 
fundamental “right of individual self-defense.” Id. at 1028-1029. 
  Most importantly, Caetano’s altercation with her ex-boyfriend occurred outside of her 
home. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Massachusetts statute which prohibited Caetano’s 
possession of the stun gun, and necessarily her ability to carry it outside her home, was deemed 
unconstitutional. Id. at 1028. This statute restricted Caetano’s ability to exercise her ability to 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense. Ultimately, this supports an argument that the right to 
carry outside the home for the purpose of self-defense is protected by the Second Amendment. 
Cf. Id. at 1028-1029 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting approvingly that the carry of an arm provided 
protection and prevention of further harm).  
 
B. The Historical Analysis Provided by Heller Supports the Purpose and Scope of the Right 
to Carry Outside the Home 
 
 In Heller, this Court conducted an historical analysis of the Second Amendment in order 
support the fact that its purpose was to protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598-628. In fact, this Court reiterated the notion that the Second 
Amendment merely codified a “pre-existing right.” Id. at 592. The widely understood pre-cursor 
to the Second Amendment is the right of the the people to possess arms codified in the English 
Bill of Rights in the middle of the 17th Century. Id. at 593. Importantly, the purpose of this right 
was to ensure that citizens had “arms for their defence.” Id. This understanding of the right was 
not singular to pre-ratification England. Individual state constitutions codify identical rights 
shortly after ratification. See Id. at 600-603 (citing the state constitutions and statutes of 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, North Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Virginia). Further, state 
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legislatures, judiciaries, and legal commentary concerning the Second Amendment from 
immediately post-ratification up to beyond the Civil War are in keeping with the analysis 
provided by Justice Scalia in Heller. Id. at 605-629.  
 Some have argued that the Second Amendment’s purpose was solely for the protection of 
the right to keep and bear arms with respect to the militia. However, such an interpretation of the 
Second Amendment is patently at odds with the precedent of Heller. Id. at 598. Justice Scalia 
indicates that although the necessity of the militia was a concern for the Second Amendment, it 
was not the only reason. Id. at 599. Ultimately, the argument for a militia-centric Second 
Amendment stipulates that self-defense was not a reason for the codification of the right 
protected by the Second Amendment. Id. However, such an argument ignores the fact that Heller 
tells us that self-defense is the “central component” of the Second Amendment. Id. The Second 
Amendment protects the right to “bear”, that is, carry arms and the core purpose of the right is 
for self-defense. Id. The need for self-defense does not present itself solely in the home. From 
these facts, it logically follows that the right to carry recognized by the Second Amendment 
extends outside the home.  
 Finally, Heller dictates that the right recognized by the Second Amendment is not 
without limitation. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Justice Scalia suggests that there are presumptively 
lawful restrictions that apply to the Second Amendment right. Id. More specifically, Heller 
indicates that laws prohibiting the carrying of weapons in places “such as schools and 
government buildings.” Id. Examined more closely, these types of restriction actually support the 
notion that the right to carry extends outside the home. If the right to carry outside the home did 
not exist, the existence of prohibitions on the places outside the home where individuals could 
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carry would be illogical. Because of these prohibitions exist, it rationally follows that the right to 
carry exists outside the home. 
 
 II. 
THE GOOD-CAUSE RESTRICTION PLACES AN IMPERMISSIBLE BURDEN ON 
SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
 
 
 The core of the Second Amendment includes the right of law-abiding citizens to possess 
and carry firearms outside the home for the purpose of self-defense. Good-cause requirements 
such as the one imposed by Burr County impermissibly infringe on that core right. Because the 
good-cause requirement effectively bars law-abiding citizens from exercising their rights, the 
Burr County law amounts to an impermissible burden of a protected Second Amendment right. 
As such, the Burr County law cannot stand.  
 
A.  Burr County’s Good-Cause Requirement Amounts to an Effective Ban on the 
Protected Right to Carry 
 
 In Heller, this Court declared that a prohibition of handguns in the home was 
unconstitutional. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. Using this precedent, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that a ban on the carrying of weapons entirely was 
unconstitutional. Moore, 702 F.3d at 934. A key element to holding that the Illinois law banning 
carry was unconstitutional was the fact that the Seventh Circuit correctly recognized that the 
right to carry outside the home was protected by the Second Amendment. Id. at 936. After 
establishing the right to carry for self-defense existed outside the home, it was coherent that the 
ban on carry was impermissible. Id. The Seventh Circuit and this Court have each recognized 
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that bans on protected Second Amendment rights are unconstitutional. Id.; see also Heller, 554 
U.S. at 636.  
 Five years after the decision in Moore, The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit addressed “good-cause” requirements in Wrenn v. District of 
Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In Wrenn, the court considered a good-cause provision 
that required citizens to show a “greater than average” need for self defense. Id. 665-666. The 
court concluded that “good-cause” requirements amounted to a total ban on the protected right to 
publicly carry a firearm. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the good-cause 
requirement allowed only a select minority of citizens access to their protected Second 
Amendment right to carry publicly. Id. Consequently, the court determined that such a restrictive 
“good-cause” provision was unconstitutional because it amounted to an effective ban on the right 
to carry for self-defense for a majority of residents. Id.   
 Like the Seventh Circuit in Moore, the D.C. Circuit correctly interpreted Heller to 
conclude that the core of the Second Amendment conventionally protects “carrying in public for 
self-defense.” Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659. The Seventh Circuit even contends that the rights to keep 
and to bear are “on equal footing.” Id. at 663. Looking to history and the analysis put forth in 
Heller, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the government must allow law-abiding 
citizens “some reasonable means” of exercising both the right to keep and the right to bear. Id. 
Because of this, the good-cause requirement, when combined with an outright ban on open-carry 
was unconstitutional according to the Wrenn court. Id.  
 Columbia as a whole, bans the open-carrying of weapons. (R. at 23). Pursuant to the 
Columbia Penal Code, persons may not publicly carry firearms without a Permit to Carry a 
Concealed Weapon (CCW Permit). Columbia Penal Code § 900.1(A). It necessarily follows 
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from this, that acquiring a Permit to Carry a Concealed Weapon is the sole means of exercising 
the right to carry protected by the Second Amendment. Id. Among the prerequisites for obtaining 
this permit is the “good cause” provision. This provision requires a citizen applying for a CCW 
permit to provide a “good cause” for the ability to exercise their Second Amendment right; that 
is, publicly carry a firearm. Columbia Penal Code § 900.1(F)(4).  
 The application for the CCW permit further defines “good cause” as a series of 
conditions that differentiate the applicant “from the mainstream.” (R. at 24). Merriam-Webster 
defines “mainstream” as a “prevailing direction of activity.” Mainstream, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1961) Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581-585 
(consulting 18th Century dictionaries for the definitions of “keep and bear arms”).  In order to be 
outside of the mainstream, one must necessarily be a minority. By definition, the mainstream is 
the prevailing group--that is, the majority. Additionally, the good-cause restriction allows 
individuals to exercise their protected right to carry only when the county sees fit; that is, decides 
an individual is outside the mainstream, or meets the subjective standard established by county 
officials (R. at 24). Like the good-cause restriction evaluated in Wrenn, Burr County’s good-
cause requirement denies a majority of its citizens the ability to carry a weapon publicly. Wrenn, 
864 F.3d at 666. As Justice Scalia indicated in Heller, the right of the Second Amendment is not 
immune to limitation. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. However, the good-cause restriction goes beyond 
a limitation, and establishes an operative ban on the protected right of individuals to publicly 






B. Burr County’s Good-Cause Requirement is Too Restrictive Under Strict Scrutiny 
  The two relevant tests used for determining the constitutionality of a regulation, such as 
the good-cause requirement that imposes on a constitutional right are intermediate scrutiny, and 
strict scrutiny. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 656. Courts deciding the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply 
to a good-cause regulation would ask whether the law burdens protected conduct. Woollard, 712 
F.3d at 875; see also United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010).  A strict 
scrutiny analysis applies to regulations which “substantially impose” on the core of a 
constitutional right. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000). This Court in Heller, concluded that the core of the 
Second Amendment right was related to self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. Any regulation 
which burdens the core of the right--that is, self-defense--necessarily triggers the application of 
strict scrutiny. As such, the good-cause requirement substantially imposes on the core of the 
Second Amendment rights of Burr County citizens. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657; see also Moore 
702 F.3d at 940. Some circuit courts have concluded that good-cause provisions do not 
substantially impose on the Second Amendment. For example, the Second Circuit and the Third 
Circuit have each maintained that strict scrutiny was not applicable to good-cause requirements. 
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013). However, 
each court misapprehended Heller’s teachings on self-defense and the acute need to preserve it 
outside the home. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; Drake, 724 F.3d at 436. 
 Strict scrutiny requires that regulation which burdens constitutionally protected conduct 
must be supported by a substantial or compelling state interest. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013). Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the regulation be carefully crafted 
to a “compelling public interest.” Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 656. Put another way, the regulation must 
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fit the compelling interest in the least restrictive way available given the circumstances. See 
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 Importantly, the good-cause requirement put forth by Burr County does fail to meet the 
“least restrictive” means requirement of strict scrutiny for a number of reasons. First, assuming 
arguendo that the good-cause requirement does not institute a total ban, it nevertheless restricts 
the ability of citizens that can carry to a minority. A restriction that eliminates a majority of 
citizens is by no means “least restrictive.” Second, this Court in Heller stated that the handgun is 
the “quintessential,” and “most popular” self-defense weapon of United States citizens. Heller, 
554 U.S. at 629. The Burr County good-cause provision obstructs access to the “quintessential” 
weapon utilized for the exercise of the protected right to self-defense recognized by Heller. Id. at 
592. The County could undoubtedly utilize less restrictive ways of firearm regulation than a 
restriction which denies a majority of law-abiding citizens access to their constitutional rights. 
For instance, Burr County could try additional “sensitive area” prohibitions recognized by this 
Court in Heller. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Burr County could also attempt to identify individuals 
who pose a threat of crime or other dangerous activity. See e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 
638 (7th Cir. 2010) (expanding limitations on firearm possession to violent misdemeanants) 
 Finally, the good-cause requirement fails under the reasonable fit analysis of strict 
scrutiny. Justice Silverman’s dissenting opinion in Peruta, argues that a reasonable fit is 
impossible in circumstances where the good-cause standard is arbitrarily applied from county to 
county. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 958 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017)(Silverman, J. dissenting).  According to the application for a 
CCW in Burr County, the county is given the discretion to define good-cause. Here, the Burr 
County definition is arbitrarily applied by the county.  As such, the good-cause requirement 
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should fail to meet the reasonable fit element of a strict scrutiny analysis. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 
958.  
 
C. Burr County’s Good-Cause Restriction Fails Under Intermediate Scrutiny   
 With respect to Burr County’s good-cause requirement, intermediate scrutiny is not 
applicable for three specific reasons. First, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for regulations 
which do not burden the core of a constitutional right. Second, Burr County has not provided 
sufficient “substantial” evidence to support a reasonable fit between the good-cause requirement 
and the government interest of public safety. Third, Circuit Court precedent establishes that 
restrictions banning violent criminals from possessing firearms are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Booker, F.3d 12 
(1st Cir. 2011). The fact that the federal government applies intermediate scrutiny to regulations 
that restrict the Second Amendment rights of violent criminals indicates that a higher level of 
scrutiny is appropriate for law-abiding citizens.  
 Assuming that intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate, the good-cause restriction still 
fails to meet the requirements set by this Court’s precedent. Under intermediate scrutiny, Burr 
County is required to show that the good-cause requirement must be supported by a substantial 
or compelling state interest and have a reasonable fit with respect to accomplishing said interest. 
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. There is no doubt that Burr County has a compelling interest in 
public safety or decreasing gun violence. However, the fact that Burr County has a compelling 
interest in public safety does not condone the implementation of a restriction as acute as the 
good-cause requirement. (R. at 12). As previously mentioned, Burr County’s good-cause 
restriction is subjectively applied, and cannot possibly be a “reasonable fit” with respect to the 
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county’s interest. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 958. Further, the Seventh Circuit addressed the fact that 
recent studies have shown that bans on the carrying of weapons do not lead to an increase in gun 
ownership, or an increase in homicide rates. Moore, 702 F.3d at 938-940. Ultimately, Burr 
County has failed to meet the burden required by intermediate scrutiny because there is not a 
reasonable fit between the restriction and the compelling interest.  
 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.  
 
Respectfully submitted.  
By: /s/ Jeffrey Della Rocco  
Jeffrey Della Rocco 
Law Offices of Jeffrey Della Rocco 
4 Gehrig Avenue  
Burr County, Columbia 12345 
 
Attorney for Petitioner 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I certify that, on March 9, 2018, I served a copy of this Brief of counsel for the Petitioner 
via electronic mail.  
 
By: /s/ Jeffrey Della Rocco  
Jeffrey Della Rocco 
Attorney for Petitioner 
